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Abstract
Background: In Germany and Chile, substitutive private health insurance has been shaped by its co-existence with
statutory social health insurance. Despite differences in the way choice is available to users in the health insurance
regimes of Chile and Germany, the way in which each country has managed choice between private health
insurance and statutory social health insurance provides a unique opportunity to comparatively assess the
consequences of such an arrangement that has been previously underexamined.
Methods: We conducted a Most Similar Systems Design comparative policy analysis of the co-occurring private health
insurance and statutory social health insurance systems in Germany and Chile. We describe and review the origins and
development of the German and Chilean health care insurance systems with an emphasis on the substitutive co-existence
between private health insurance and statutory social health insurance. We provide a critique of the market performance of
the private health insurance regime in each country followed by a comparative assessment of the impact of private health
insurance on financial protection, equity, and risk segmentation.
Results: Segmentation of insurance markets in both Germany and Chile has had significant consequences for equity,
fairness, and financial protection. Due to market failures in health insurance and differences in the regulatory frameworks
governing public and private insurers, the choice of public or private coverage has produced strong incentives for private
insurers to select for risks, compromising equity in health care funding, heightening the financial risk borne by public insurers
and lowering incentives for private insurers to operate efficiently.
Conclusions: The degree of conflict arising from the substitutive parallel private health insurance system and the statutory
social health insurance system varies between Germany and Chile, though policy goals remain similar. Recent reforms in
both countries have attempted to improve the financial protection of the privately insured through regulation; nevertheless,
concerns about risk segmentation remain largely unresolved.
Background
In Germany and Chile, substitutive private health insur-
ance coexists with social health insurance schemes
which cover the majority of their respective populations
[1–4]. Although only a minority of the population in
each country is covered by private health insurance, the
choice between private and social insurance plays an im-
portant role in both countries’ health systems and
crucially shapes the boundaries between the private and
public health systems, and the regulation, financing and
provision of each [5, 6]. One of the most discussed re-
sults of choice between private and social health insur-
ance is risk segmentation [7]. In both countries, it has
been argued that this phenomenon is a direct conse-
quence of choice. The funds from those who are able to
afford and choose private health insurance are pooled
separately from mandatory social health insurance wage
deductions, creating strong incentives for private in-
surers to select for those who can afford private health
insurance [4, 8]. In Germany, the choice of opting out of
the statutory system is restricted to those with an
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income above a certain threshold. Once an individual
has chosen private insurance, the option of returning to
the social health insurance regime is limited. In Chile,
the choice of private insurance is dependent only on
ability to pay because private plans are considerably
more expensive than contributions to the public system
and there are no limitations on who may or may not
purchase private health insurance as in the German case
[9]. However, the privately insured in Chile may re-join
the statutory system at any time, an option which is pro-
hibited in Germany to reduce the potential for further
risk segmentation.
Taking into account the different dimensions of regu-
lation, financing and provision [10], choice and the free
flow of users between insurance regimes [7], the main
objective of this comparative policy analysis is to analyze
how the designs of the German and Chilean substitutive
private health insurance regimes have led to risk seg-
mentation and created financial barriers to health cover-
age [5, 7, 10]. We decided to base our analyses on
Germany and Chile based on a Most Similar Systems
Design (MSSD) [11] because: a) they present crucial
similarities in their respective health system designs,
such as the substitutive nature of both private insurance
regimes, b) the public-private insurance mix, although
different, has the potential to inform discussion around
policy reform in both countries and their World Health
Organisation (WHO) sub-regions, c) the choice between
public and private insurance has been available for sig-
nificant periods (from 1970 to the present day in
Germany, and since 1981 in Chile), with Germany being
the only country in Europe still allowing substitutive
choice [4, 7]. Moreover, in the context of universal
health coverage, various countries have considered emu-
lating the German model such as Italy, Portugal and the
United Kingdom in the 1990s, and Croatia, Portugal,
Russia, Slovakia and Slovenia in the 2000’s [7, 12–14].
Debates about the choice between public or private in-
surance in these countries have been framed in terms of
offering some, or all, of the population the possibility of
opting out of the public insurance scheme [7].
This analysis deals with current policy debates which
may overstate the potential benefits of choice in insurance
markets [7]. Another benefit of comparing both countries
is the opportunity to assess the ways in which differing
policies on the flow of users between private and publicly
insurers in Chile and Germany may elucidate the ways in
which these policies have played crucial functions in how
risk segmentation has been tackled. We expand on this,
arguing that in Germany and Chile the choice of social
and private health insurance has jeopardized equity and
fairness, with far-reaching consequences for their health
systems. We define equity in health care as equality of
utilization, distribution according to need, equality of
access, and equality of health [15–17]. We are interested
in discussing the effect that risk segmentation has on
equity, and whether the negative effects on equity might
be expressed more strongly in a country that allows a free
flow of users, such as Chile. We focused on equity and
efficiency as primary outcomes because these particular
analytical concepts are key to WHO’s health policy goals
for health insurance [18].
Methods
Our study of health care insurance policy in Germany
and Chile adopts a comparative case study approach
based on two countries using the MSSD [11]. Under the
MSSD framework, comparative policy analysis proceeds
with the selection of cases which share key salient fea-
tures (e.g. policy design, sociodemographic characteris-
tics) and an analysis of divergent policy outcomes. Given
our interest in the interface between statutory health in-
surance and private health insurance, specifically systems
in which beneficiaries may transition between public and
private coverage, we selected Germany and Chile for our
analysis. Germany and Chile share similarities in their
respective organisation of choice between public or pri-
vate health insurance and, moreover, the way in which
they have organised the boundaries between them may
inform future policy developments and health system
reform in both Europe and South America [11].
We begin by tracing the origins and development of
the modern health insurance regimes in each country re-
spectively before engaging in a comparative policy ana-
lysis of each country’s approach to regulating health
insurance and its divergent consequences on health
equity and efficiency. We adopt a mixed methods
approach, integrating both qualitative and quantitative
data from the literature where available; nevertheless, we
acknowledge the difficulties of direct comparisons
between these two disparate countries. As such, we
conducted a focused literature and policy documents
search and used a thematic approach to analysis, in line
with the research question, highlighting empirical find-
ings from the literature to support comparative state-
ments between Germany and Chile where possible.
Documents were collected thematically in English,
German and Spanish by searching for “private health
insurance” and “social health insurance” adding then
“Germany” and “Chile”. In the case of Chile we searched
directly for “FONASA” and “ISAPRE” and in the case of
Germany for “GKV” “PKV” from PubMed, Google
Scholar. We also searched from the OECD document re-
pository together with documents in the public domain
such as policy releases and comments. Searches were
conducted between March 2015 to November 2017 and
reviewed for relevance and currency. Please see PRISMA
chart for details of search results (Additional file 1).
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Framework for analysis
In order to outline the role that private insurance plays
in Germany and Chile, we will start by defining it ac-
cording to the taxonomy of private insurance proposed
by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD), which states that primary private
health insurance is private insurance which represents
the only available access to basic health cover because
either individuals choose not or are not entitled to have
public health insurance [19]. Using the same OECD
taxonomy for classifying health insurance systems, in
both countries being examined private health insurance
can be classified as primary substitutive, which is to say,
private health insurance is substituted for cover which
would otherwise be offered through social insurance or
a publicly financed insurance scheme [19].
To assess regulation, financing and provision of health
care/insurance in Germany and Chile, our comparative
analysis will use the framework proposed by Wendt and
Rothgang [5, 10]. Wendt and Rothgang’s deductively
generated framework classifies health systems according
to the three dimensions of regulation, financing, and
provision of health care/insurance, yielding ten theoret-
ically plausible types of health care systems where only
five system types are observed in practice: the National
Health Service, the National Health Insurance, the Social
Health Insurance, the Etatist Social Health Insurance,
and the Private Health System [5, 10]. One of the rea-
sons for comparing both countries is that they have both
provided a choice of healthcare plans for those able to
afford them. The dynamic between choice and the differ-
ent aspects that it entails is important to analyse due to
its effects on efficiency and equity. For assessing the
interaction between the three dimensions (regulation, fi-
nancing and provision) and choice, we will use the
framework provided by Thomson and Mossialos [7]
which analyses the impact of giving consumers choice
between public or private health insurance. Specifically,
Thomson and Mossialos highlight the ways in which
arguments by proponents of consumer choice in health
care, who usually argue that consumer choice among
health plans promote competition between public and
private insurers, are undermined by market failures
unique to health insurance markets, primarily involving
information asymmetry [7]. Thomson and Mossialos
detail an approach where policy examination focuses on
whether or not they have engendered risk segmentation
and whether or not they have created financial barriers
to private coverage [7].
In this paper, we hypothesize that allowing a substitutive
choice of insurance is likely to result in two main outcomes:
a market segmented by degree of risk and by financial bar-
riers to private coverage for high risks. We advance the ar-
gument that private health insurance suffers from serious
market failures largely due to asymmetries of information
that tend to negatively affect efficiency and equity in health
systems [20]. Furthermore, health insurance markets af-
fected by adverse selection tend to be inefficient because
they deter people with low health risks from buying com-
prehensive coverage, without cost sharing and at a fair price
[7, 21]. Additionally, the threat of adverse selection creates
incentives for private insurers to use risk selection as com-
petitive strategy, by attracting people with low health risk
and excluding those with high risk [7]. Our comparative
analysis will follow the same definition of equity and effi-
ciency used by Thomson and Mossialos [7], acknowledging
the multiple interpretations of equity and efficiency that are
associated with diverse cultural and societal values [7, 21].
This work compared choice of public or private health in-
surance in Germany and The Netherlands, two countries
with similar socio-demographic characteristics and income
levels while also both being Member States of the European
Union. So far the comparison of high middle income coun-
tries like Chile with high income countries like Germany
has not been performed and might prove crucial to define
health reform discussion in the EU and beyond. In our
work we will compare two countries with different levels of
income that offer substitutive private health insurance in
order to assess whether individuals are treated equally
based on how public contributions or private premiums are
determined by features such as health status, income, age
and household size as indicators of horizontal equity [7].
For both Germany and Chile, we analyse the degree of
progressivity in financing health as an indicator of verti-
cal equity by assessing whether those who receive higher
incomes pay proportionately more than those with lower
incomes [7]. For productive efficiency, usually defined as
outputs achieved from given inputs, we will discuss how
competition is based on risk selection rather than price
and/or perceptions or quantitative measures of quality
in Germany and Chile [7]. Productive efficiency will also
be assessed by examining how private insurers reduce
operating costs by lowering their administrative costs,
and to what extent insurers try to decrease premium
prices by adjusting provider fees and influencing pro-
vider behaviour [7, 20, 22]. We will include both empir-
ical and qualitative data in this review in order to
compare both countries using the framework proposed
by Wendt and Rothgang Our analysis takes a long-term
perspective, beginning with the creation of PHI in the
1880’s for both countries to then be organised and
follow the most important policy milestones of health
insurance reform in both countries in the last 50 years.
Results
Private health Insurance in Germany and Chile
From the searches of policy documents and databases
we found Records identified through database searching
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(PubMed & Google Scholar) we were able to retrieve 24
publications and 55 additional records identified through
other government or policy sources such as OECD. We
then screened 79 records removing 4 duplicates re-
moved and assessing 75 full-text publications for eligibil-
ity. Three publications were excluded, because of falling
outside the scope of our work. 72 studies were then fi-
nally included in our qualitative synthesis.
In Germany and Chile private health insurance has
historically developed alongside statutory health insur-
ance. In Germany, statutory health insurance was made
mandatory for industrial workers in 1884, constituting
the first national social insurance scheme of its kind [2].
All other population groups were formally excluded
from statutory health insurance at the time and could
only obtain health care coverage privately, if at all. Statu-
tory insurance has expanded over time and since 1989,
all workers with earnings above a certain threshold were
given a choice between statutory health insurance
(Gesetzliche Krankenversicherung - GKV) and private
coverage (Private Krankenversicherungen - PKV) except
for civil servants who have always had private coverage
in addition to support from the state.
Under current legislation, private health insurance is
required to comprehensively cover both ambulatory and
hospital care, although insurance plans vary with regard
to other forms of health care (e.g. dentistry, eye care, al-
ternative medicine). Since 1994, individuals over the age
of 65 years (55 years since 2000) are legally prohibited
from returning to the GKV once they have decided to
opt for PKV, even if their earnings drop below the in-
come threshold. This measure was introduced to protect
sickness funds from further risk segmentation resulting
from younger people opting for private coverage and
re-joining the GKV once they are older and find their
private premiums more than contributions to GKV.
Health insurance in Chile came to existence in the
1880s inspired by the same Bismarckian principles of so-
cial protection stemming from Germany [23]. In 1952
Chile created the Chilean National Health Service
(Servicio Nacional de Salud - SNS) after the British Na-
tional Health Service with a complementary insurance
regime for private users and white-collar workers. This
system was in place until 1980 when after a right wing
military coup that toppled the Socialist President Salva-
dor Allende, a set of health reforms imposed by the mili-
tary junta led by General Augusto Pinochet created the
legal and institutional framework for substitutive private
health insurance. It stipulated that workers in the formal
economy could choose to pay a mandatory 4% of their
taxable wage income into a public or private insurance
fund [24]. Individuals were able to choose between join-
ing the centralised statutory health insurance scheme
called National Health Fund (Fondo Nacional de Salud -
FONASA) or taking out private health insurance pre-
miums from a variety of different for profit companies
collectively named Private Health Institutes (Institutos
de Salud Previsional - ISAPRE) [25]. This policy enacted
significant changes in the financing of health care in
Chile and led to risk segmentation with important con-
sequences for the overall equity of the health system [26,
27]. For example, by 1988 the ISAPRE system contribu-
tions had increased from 4 to 7%, covering only 11% of
the population; yet they collected more than 50% of the
mandatory health care contributions, accounting for
38% of the total health care expenditure [25].
After 17 years of neglect caused by the structural ad-
justment programme of the military dictatorship and
with the country’s return to democracy in 1990, health
reform became a top priority for the newly elected
democratic government [24]. President Patricio Aylwin
enacted an ambitious infrastructure programme while
also improving the work conditions of the health work
force during the 1990s [24]. From 2003 to 2004, Presi-
dent Ricardo Lagos designed a reform package address-
ing the problems arising from the parallel existence of
private and statutory health insurance [28]. The reforms
tackled what was seen as the serious problem of risk
segmentation of the insurance market and attempted to
increase financial protection across the private and pub-
lic insurance sub-systems [1].
The most important bill of the reforms was the 2005
‘Long Law’ of ISAPRE. This bill defined a state guaran-
teed set of fully covered medical conditions based on
disability-adjusted life years (DALY) for both the public
and private health insurance regimes [1]. This was
termed the System of Explicit Health Guarantees
(Garantias Explicitas en Salud - GES). It ensured that
ISAPRE plans would provide a basic price for each of
the existing plans (which currently number around
64,000), differing in its total price depending on the risk
profile of the user while maintaining any price raise
within a 30% threshold of the mean price for a private
health plan. It determined a set of clinical guidelines and
pathways, introduced preset periods for diagnosis, treat-
ment, or follow-up with a maximum of out-of-pocket
expense cap and waiting times, after which private pro-
viders for the services could be used [29]. The number
of conditions covered was expanded from 2 in 2004 to
80 in 2015 and eventually has included all major disease
areas which carried the highest burden of disease and
disability in Chile [26, 27]. In 2005, further legislation in-
troduced rules for annual premium changes that were to
be calculated from a table of pre-defined risk factors,
which were already in use by private insurers [30]. How-
ever, the table of risk factors was declared unconstitu-
tional by the Constitutional Tribunal in 2010, who
deemed the table to be discriminating according to
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gender and age and creating a crucial legal challenge to
ISAPRE [31]. So far ISAPRE are still able to use the table
of risk factors to set annual premium charges for people
changing insurance carriers and new affiliates. The
current government of President Sebastian Piñera has
avoided regulating this issue and a final policy resolution
in this matter is still pending.
Regulation
Health insurance in Germany is heavily regulated
through legislation. Social Code Book V (Sozialgesetz-
buch - SGB V) regulates all aspect of statutory health in-
surance, including criteria for eligibility. While SGB V
does not regulate private health insurance directly (per-
haps apart from the ‘basic tariff ’ and the price setting for
Diagnosis Related Group - DRG in the hospital sector),
changes in legislation aimed at reforming the GKV often
affect private health insurance. In addition, private
health insurance is regulated through several laws and
ordinances that apply to the insurance market in general
(e.g. the insurance contract law) or to private health in-
surance specifically (e.g. provisions for savings). Financial
oversight of the private health insurance market is exer-
cised by the Federal Supervisory Office for Financial Ser-
vices (Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht
BaFin), an agency of the Ministry of Finance. Develop-
ments in the private health insurance sector are also
closely observed by the Ministry of Health, although the
Ministry has little direct control over the market. Private
health insurance also qualifies for tax subsidies, as does
statutory health insurance and other forms of insurance.
Since January 2010, a special tax subsidy applies exclu-
sively to health insurance, covering both private health
insurance premiums (for health services equivalent to
the regular GKV benefits package) and GKV contribu-
tions, again not privileging private insurance [32].
Since 2005, changes in the price of premiums in Chile
are regulated by the newly created Health Superintend-
ence (Superintendencia de Salud), which became the
government’s main regulatory body for ISAPRE and
FONASA. This body sets a basic premium that centrally
determines the scope for annual increases in premiums.
ISAPRE are bound by this base premium and have to set
premiums within a 30% ‘premium band’, limiting their
ability to differentiate premiums according to different
types of plans or customers [33]. In addition, the Health
Superintendence laid down rules in regards to the risk
factors used to calculate premiums, legislation which
was controversial and particularly opposed by ISAPRE
but was deemed discriminatory in 2010 [30, 31]. A risk
equalization fund redistributes resources between
ISAPRE adjusting for the financial risks associated with
factors such as gender, age, diagnostic categories, and
morbidity, as a mechanism to fund the community-rated
explicit guarantees [34]. This mechanism aims to com-
pensate private insurers for the income lost because of
the new regulatory framework and the costs associated
with the introduction of explicit guarantees. It also aims
to provide an incentive for insurers to reduce risk selec-
tion. So far, the impact on the ISAPRE of this risk com-
pensation fund has been negligible, considering that
GES benefits for ISAPRE users were care packages that
did not allow choice of providers which many users con-
sidered an important factor in their decision to choose
private health insurance. This, among other issues, was
exploited by ISAPRE public relations campaigns aimed
at reducing the impact that GES might have on the pri-
vate subsystem. All these issues make a strong case for
the fundamental difference between countries being re-
lated to the type of regulation and the levels at which it
operates. Considering Germany is a Federal country with
a much larger population and a sophisticated health pol-
icy agenda, Chile faces far stronger opposition to thor-
ough and extensive reform of the current system.
Financing
Although similar in their public-private health insurance
configurations, there are important differences between
Chile and Germany. These include respective gross do-
mestic product (GDP) per capita, health expenditure as
proportion of GDP, the size of the private insurance
market and the amount of private spending [35, 36]. For
example, total spending on health care in Germany was
11% of GDP in 2013, 76.3% of which was public funding
[35]. About 87.5% of the population (2011) are members
of a GKV fund [37]. In addition, about 11.7% are covered
by substitutive private health insurance [38]. The
remaining recipients of subsidies (Beihilfe) are civil ser-
vants, members of the armed forces, and recipients of
social benefits or a veteran pension. Self-employed indi-
viduals are not required to join a sickness fund and usu-
ally take out private health insurance, as they would
otherwise have to pay both the employer’s and em-
ployee’s share, which makes GKV membership un-
attractive to them. Civil servants only have to cover the
remaining percentage of health care costs, for which
they can take out private insurance coverage.
There are two types of substitutive, private health in-
surance plans: Full Insurance (Vollversicherung), which
provides full coverage of the costs of health care equiva-
lent (or higher) to those covered under statutory health
insurance, and additive premiums (Zusatzversicherung),
which typically provides complementary or supplemen-
tary private health insurance coverage for the cost of
health services excluded from statutory health insurance
or co-payments. In 2011, about 22.5 million people took
out complementary/supplementary private health insur-
ance, as compared to 13.8 million in 2000 [39]. Private
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health insurance products are currently offered by 41 in-
surance companies, with 12 insurance companies having
a joint market share of 76.89% [38, 40]. 24 of these are
publicly listed corporations, usually with a wider insur-
ance portfolio, 17 are Mutuals specialised in health care
and 11 are subsidiaries of mutual organisations [38, 40].
Premiums in the public system are currently set at a
14.6% split between employers and employees [41]. The
employer’s share has been fixed at 7.3%, which means
that all future increases will be borne by the employee in
order to limit the burden on labour costs for employers
[41]. Sickness funds are not allowed to discriminate
among members, which is to say, all members of a fund
must be charged the same rate. For certain groups, such
as the long-term unemployed on benefits, GKV contri-
butions are paid by public authorities. Since 2009, GKV
contributions are centrally pooled, in a virtual ‘health
fund’, and distributed between sickness funds adjusted
for age, sex and morbidity. Health insurance became
mandatory in January 2009, although coverage was al-
most universal before then with only about 0.2% of
people being uninsured in 2007 [37].
In Chile, about 76.3% of the population was covered
by FONASA, while 18.2% voluntarily took out ISAPRE
[42, 43]. The remaining 2.95% of the population had in-
stitutional coverage, such as the armed forces [42, 43].In
the case of Chile, total health care expenditure in 2013
was significantly lower than in Germany, and accounted
for 7.3% of GDP of which 46.6% was publicly funded.
This was in stark contrast to Germany’s large share of
public expenditure, which may be expected with a pri-
vate insurance market half of Chile’s size [35]. In 2015,
there were 13 ISAPRE companies, with the three largest
having a market share of almost 60% [44]. There is also
a growing market for complementary health insurance,
with 12.3% of the population having purchased some
sort of complementary insurance plan by 2010 [44].
However, complementary insurance is offered almost ex-
clusively through group contracts, which constitute
around 87% of the total market [45].
In Chile, out-of-pocket (OOP) expenditure has created
serious barriers to health care access and use [9].
Out-of-pocket payments as a percentage of total health
expenditure remain remarkably high in Chile (32.4%) as
compared to Germany (12.9%) and the OECD average
(19%), and are one of the main barriers of access to
health and a serious determinant of catastrophic ex-
penditure [46, 47]. Households that face difficulties pay-
ing medical bills may delay or even forgo needed health
care [48]. This is evidenced by the fact that ISAPRE
users have larger OOP payments than FONASA users
(respectively 6.1 and 3.8% of their income in 2013), not
only in absolute terms, but also in terms of the share of
their income devoted to direct payments [9, 49].
Eligibility, benefits and premium conditions
Eligibility for substitutive private insurance in Germany
is limited to those not mandatorily insured under GKV.
By 2018 GKV membership is mandatory for employees
with earnings below €59,400 a year, some self-employed
professions such as farmers, artists and journalists, stu-
dents, those receiving unemployment benefits, people
with a disability (if they work in a recognised institution)
and retired people who were a member of a sickness
fund prior to retirement. Employees who have earned
above the threshold for one year and their dependants
(about 20% of the population) can opt for substitutive
private coverage, which exempts them from contributing
to GKV.
In Germany, private health insurance premiums are
based on an assessment of an individual’s risk profile at
the time of purchase. Variables considered include age,
sex and the medical history of the applicant. For em-
ployees, the cost of the premium is typically shared with
the employer. The employer’s share includes premiums
for the insured and his/her dependants. It is set at 50%
of the rate that employers and employees would have to
contribute if the employee were GKV-insured and is
capped at 50% of the actual insurance premium [50].
Dependants are not automatically covered and must pay
separate premiums. Cover is for life and operates on a
funded basis. Since 2001, insurers have been required to
build up ‘ageing reserves’ to cover age-related increases
in costs (and slow the increase of premiums) later in life
– these reserves are built by charging all clients between
the age of 21 and 60 an additional 10% of all premium
payments made.
German insurers may reject applications and exclude
pre-existing conditions from cover or charge a higher
premium to cover these conditions. However, since 2009
they are required to accept any applicant (open enrol-
ment) who is eligible for the basic tariff and cannot ex-
clude cover of pre-existing conditions for this tariff.
Individuals who have opted for private insurance after
January 1, 2009, including people over the age of
55 years, and those receiving benefits or a pension are
eligible. The basic tariff covers services provided by
GKV at a capped premium (€656 per month in January
2016). If an individual demonstrates an inability to afford
the full premium for the basic tariff, the premium will
be reduced by 50% and the remainder will be subsidised
by the state. If this remains unaffordable, individuals re-
ceive a state subsidy under the social benefits scheme.
Substitutive private health insurance typically covers the
same comprehensive range of benefits as the GKV. Since
January 2009, private health insurance plans must cover
ambulatory outpatient and short-term inpatient services.
Insurers typically impose a waiting period of three
months before benefits apply, but this may be waived if
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a new customer was previously covered by the GKV
[51]. Benefits are mainly provided in cash, that is to say,
the individual pays for treatment first and is subse-
quently reimbursed by the insurer. Substitutive contracts
may involve cost sharing. For example, co-insurance is
common in dental care, where patients pay a proportion
of the total costs. Private health insurance plans can also
include deductibles, in which the deductible amount has
been capped at €5000 per year [50].
Private health insurance in Chile is available to those
who can afford private premiums. Historically, it has
been based on wage payments that in 2018 should not
exceed a predefined maximum per calendar month of
€210, which is the same cap set on premiums for users
in FONASA [52]. However, if the mandatory wage de-
duction does not cover the premium price, the remain-
der has to be paid on top of the 7% contribution.
Companies offering private plans are also allowed to ne-
gotiate wage-based contributions with customers beyond
the statutory ceiling if they wish to offer supplementary
services or a larger choice of providers [53]. Contracts
with ISAPRE are usually for one year and extensions are
subject to review based on tables of individual risk fac-
tors, while ISAPRE users are also allowed to re-join
FONASA unconditionally [24]. Private premiums are
high relative to contributions to FONASA’s four mem-
bers categories, which are paid mandatorily as 7% of in-
come. FONASA categories A and B include people no
income or with a monthly income below €345 for affili-
ation and are exempt from making contributions to
FONASA. FONASA category C includes people with a
monthly income between €345 and €505 who pay a 10%
copayment fee. People with an income higher than €505
per month are included in FONASA category D which
has a 20% copayment fee. By law, ISAPRE is required to
cover at least the same services covered in FONASA’s
two lower income plans [25, 30]. A contribution of 7%
for the chilean average monthly income in 2016 of €694
to FONASA D would thus equal to around €49, regard-
less of the risk and sex of the user [36]. The cheapest
ISAPRE premium is are in the range of €55–60 monthly
and includes similar or lower coverage than FONASA D
for a 30 year old low-risk single male individual earning
the the chilean average monthly income [54, 55]. It is
also crucial to define the progressivity of health finan-
cing in Chile considering that wage deducted contribu-
tions have historically covered less than 60% of
FONASA’s budget. In 2013, this resulted in only 42.5%
of FONASA members making wage deducted contribu-
tions to the system, while the remaining funds were sup-
plemented by direct government transfers [56].
Consequently, without a progressive tax system that
would consider the makeup of corporate and income
contributions, the proportion of sales taxes in the overall
Chilean budget, and the degree of tax evasion, any direct
State transfer to FONASA might be regressive in nature.
Provision of health services
Health care delivery is organised in Germany through a
range of health service providers, including public, pri-
vate not for profit and for profit organisations. Indeed,
pluralism of provider ownership is a statutory principle
of the German health care system and patients have a
choice of provider, regardless of their insurance status.
Hence, both GKV members and the privately insured
can access (almost) any provider, including public and
private (for profit and not for profit) providers. Private
insurers – like sickness funds – are largely bound by col-
lective agreements as to provider payments formed by
the associations of sickness funds and provider associa-
tions (i.e. German Hospital Association and Associations
of GKV Physicians). In addition, they can form agree-
ments with providers that only treat privately insured
patients. Vertical integration with providers is rare and
not permitted in some cases. For example, insurers are
not allowed to own polyclinics.
Private health insurers generally must match market
prices. In the hospital sector, prices per service are reim-
bursed based on DRG and prices are identical for statu-
tory and private health insurance. In ambulatory care,
prices are based on a list of ‘basic prices’ issued by the
Federal Ministry of Health. However, physicians can
charge higher fees by multiplying the ‘basic price’ with a
factor set to reflect the level of complexity and time for
treatment (e.g. a factor of up to 3.5 for personal services
rendered by a physician and 1.3 for laboratory services).
Physicians are also allowed to bill in excess of these
prices, although this requires approval of the insurer be-
fore the service is provided [57]. Unlike sickness funds,
insurance companies only form direct contractual rela-
tionships with clients, not with providers. Consequently,
private insurers have little leverage over providers, many
of whom can charge higher fees for privately-insured pa-
tients than for members of sickness funds. For instance,
Waldendzik et al. [58] have demonstrated that prices for
physicians’ services are more than twice as high for the
privately insured than for those covered by statutory
health insurance.
In Chile, ISAPRE and FONASA are separate providers.
However, FONASA has historically bought services from pri-
vate providers with pay as you go vouchers and more re-
cently, as part of the explicit guarantee regime, which
established that if guarantees were not met in time by public
providers, users could choose to use private providers.
FONASA’s pay as you go vouchers are part of the Free
Choice Modality (Modalidad de Libre Eleccion - MLE) that
allows those FONASA users in the upper segments (C and
D) to use private providers while incurring an increased
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percentage of copayment. This is why one can observe a
crossover between public and private providers, where
ISAPRE users that are underinsured tend to use public pro-
viders for catastrophic events and wealthier FONASA users
tend to use the MLE and pay as you go vouchers to increase
their choice and access to outpatient services. ISAPRE gener-
ally pay private providers on a fee-for-service basis, while
FONASA tends to pay public providers in the state run sub-
system based on a list of hospital and physician fees, which
are centrally defined by FONASA and the Ministry of
Health. Conversely, most ISAPRE allow free choice and tend
to use market pricing for paying their providers while, in
some cases, using lists of preferred providers and negotiating
prices for them in bulk. ISAPRE have increasingly merged
with providers, that is to say, integrating them into health
care holdings and encouraging their use by a series of finan-
cial hedges. Providers in this financing framework have a
strong incentive to over-provide services to certain private
patient groups. For instance in 2017 the rate for a caesarean
section were persistently higher for privately insured women
(69%) than for those who delivered in public hospitals
(40.9%) with a global caesarean rate of 46% according to
OECD [59, 60]. It is important to note also the high preva-
lence of caesarean sections in public providers. Escalating
health care costs have been the consequence of using
fee-for-service as method of payment under private insur-
ance. Simultaneously there has been increasing public pres-
sure on ISAPRE for what people regard as their excessive
profits in the private subsystem [61]. This is seen as one of
the reasons why ISAPRE have increasingly merged with pri-
vate providers as a way of both transferring profits to them
and controlling the cost of health services, while maintaining
the profit levels of integrated health care clusters in an in-
creasingly competitive market [61]. The main consequence is
the emergence of managed care clusters, similar to the verti-
cal integration of providers such as Health Management
Organisation (HMO) in the United States [62]. Health care
holdings linked to ISAPRE owners control about 42% of the
private provider market, even though vertical integration is
explicitly forbidden by law since 2005 [61, 62]. This prohib-
ition stems from the fact that in cases of vertical integration
the insurer can manipulate demand for health services and
steer patients to the most profitable integrated provider. So
far, vertical integration has not been challenged in Chile, des-
pite the abundant international evidence of how service inte-
gration and fee-for-service incentivise overprovision and
stimulate cost inflation.
Recent policy developments
While substitutive private health insurance has been a
source of controversy in Germany for decades, the dual
insurance system – often dubbed two-class medicine
(Zweiklassenmedizin) by its critics – is fiercely defended
by the medical profession. As the political costs of
change are high, changes are largely introduced at the
margins of the system. For example, the 2007 reform in-
troduced optional tariffs (Wahltarife) within the GKV,
which allow sickness funds to offer a more diversified
range of insurance plans, such as those with deductibles,
which previously had only been offered to those with
private coverage. These new tariffs have at least in part
aimed to attract or retain those who are able to choose
between GKV and private coverage.
Following the coming into force of the Act to Promote
Competition within the GKV (GKV-Wettbewerbsstär-
kungsgesetz) in 2009, health insurance, public or private,
became mandatory for all residents. Concurrently, pri-
vate insurers were required to offer a ‘basic tariff ’ (see
eligibility, benefits and premium conditions). Since 2009,
customers have been allowed to take the portion of the
ageing reserve attributable to the basic tariff with them
if they change insurance company (or the entire reserve
if they change plan within the same company). The aim
was to reduce the barriers for customers to switch be-
tween private insurers and to promote competition
among companies. It is important to note that competi-
tion is restricted to those who can voluntarily join statu-
tory insurance. This is a crucial issue in the German
system, particularly considering that it is important to
differentiate competition between the two insurance sys-
tems from that of competing for privately insured per-
sons alone.
Since 2013, the abolition of out-of-pocket practice fees
for the statutorily insured came into force with the aim
of restoring equity. Beginning in 2004, the €10 fee that
was paid quarterly by GKV for those insured above the
age of 18 was aimed at reducing doctor visits. However,
no decrease in doctor visits was observed and one unin-
tended consequence of the policy was that it ended up
targeting low-income individuals, leading to a decrease
in equity. GKV reforms have also focused on regional
equity, i.e. introducing financial incentives to encourage
the settlement of doctors in underserved and structurally
weak regions (Act to Strengthen Care Provision in the
Statutory Health Insurance system 2012 and 2015) [63].
Reforms in 2015 focused on the development of the fi-
nance structure and the quality of statutory health insurance.
Wage-based contributions were lowered from 15.5 to 14.6%
in 2015, while allowing sickness funds to charge additional
contributions (income-related and without upper limit). By
2018 these range from 0 to 1.7%. In addition, insured mem-
bers can switch to competing sickness funds more easily if a
sickness fund decides to increase additional contributions
above the national average, which is to be determined each
November (1,0% in 2018) [63]. However, whether this policy
will stimulate competition and efficiency in the statutory
health insurance market is debateable, given that additional
contribution rates are expected to rise in future.
Roman-Urrestarazu et al. International Journal for Equity in Health  (2018) 17:112 Page 8 of 14
In 2014, a new round of health reforms tried to tackle the
entrenched inequity of the system in Chile, which was
caused by illnesses and disorders falling outside the explicit
guarantee regime and the existence of high levels of
co-payments in both parts of the system [34]. This led to
the creation of the preferred provider network of the
Additional Coverage of Catastrophic Events (Cobertura
Adicional de Enfermedades Catastroficas – CAEC) in 2013
for ISAPRE users aimed at dimishing the impact of OOP in
catastrophic events and also the Financing System for Diag-
nosis and Treatment of High Cost Programs (“Ricarte Soto”
Law), which was established in 2015 to increase financial
protection and catastrophic coverage for those illnesses not
included in the explicit guarantee regime for both ISAPRE
and FONASA users. The Financing System for Diagnosis
and Treatment of High Cost Programs is funded entirely
through state contributions and does not require the pay-
ment of an additional premium. FONASA currently admin-
isters this fund, and all beneficiaries of the Chilean health
care system are entitled to use it. This can be interpreted as
a covert subsidy to ISAPRE since the central government
will be financing the fund. With the same goal in mind, in
2011 a new policy abolished the 7% health care contribu-
tion for pensioners over the age of 65 in the four poorest
quintiles of the population. Again, those primarily affected
FONASA users were older people, and higher risks; which
in real terms meant higher state transfers to the public in-
surance scheme. This policy was intended as a direct cash
transfer by the state, aiming at effectively increasing the
monthly income of pensioners.
In 2015, the newly appointed Advisory Commission of
the Presidency was commissioned by President Bachelet
with the mandate of dealing with the relationship be-
tween the two subsystems [42]. The Commission recog-
nised that private health insurance reform affects the
entire system and produced a series of proposals. The
commission was formed as a cross party initiative and
developed two proposals presented to the President [42].
These were a majority proposal and an alternative mi-
nority proposal. The majority proposal recommended
the creation of a Universal Health Fund (Fondo Manco-
munado de Salud Universal - FMSU) in the form of a
single health insurance and with a single payer mechan-
ism alongside supplementary and or complementary pri-
vate health insurance [42]. The minority proposal
suggested a less disruptive option which entailed con-
tinuing with the free choice of private health insurance
alongside the state sponsored regime. The Universal
Health Common Fund would pool all contributions with
direct state transfers that would together finance Chile’s
health care system and cover all residents.
The Presidential Commission also proposed creating a
Cluster of Health Benefits (Conjunto de Beneficios
Sociales - CBS); this would include almost all policies
and mechanisms of financial protection such as GES,
CAEC and the “Ricarte Soto” Law. Similarly, the Presi-
dential Commission also proposed that inter-ISAPRE
discrimination based on pre-existing health conditions
should be gradually removed from the entire system.
The new insurance premium proposed by the Presidential
Comission would still correspond to the legal contribution of
7% per household and allow access to a broad range of pro-
viders and a community premium for individuals to access
other networks. Unlike the current insurance contracts, price
re-adjustments would be regulated on the basis of costs and/
or evaluation by expert panels and with capped profit levels.
The Presidential Commission also suggested reducing
the number of commercialized plans to three, instead of
currently 14,000, to increase the transparency of the
market [42, 64]. Additionally, supplementary health in-
surance would only be allowed for CBS users, restricting
the private insurance market considerably [64]. To com-
pensate for the increased health risk, the Inter-ISAPRE
Risk Compensation Fund would adjust the total of the
CBS and consider the total legal quota. The creation of
the FMSU would establish a basic foundation for the
solidarity between systems, which does not currently
exist. At present, surpluses accumulated by an individual
through premium payments are returned to the con-
tributor, while the new law proposes to enter the surplus
into a pooled fund. Finally, the implementation of the
amendments to the law would be voluntary for current
contract holders but mandatory for new contracts. The
non-legally-binding majority proposal of the Presidential
Commision thus integrated some aspects of the German
private insurance regime, such as the Universal Health
Common Fund. At the same time, it did not achieve a
quorum to support the recommendations producing a
minority proposal. So far, it has not been clear whether
the task of the Commission or its recommendations will
be integrated as part of Chile’s health reform and there-
fore they remain part of a discussion rather than a solid
and consistent policy plan with a path to implementa-
tion. The conclusions and recommendations of the
Presidential Commission have not produced any change
in health policy. One could also argue that the conclu-
sions, being non-binding, follow the long precedent of
Chilean Commissions, going as far back as the Indigen-
ous Affairs Commission of 2001 (Comision Verdad y
Nuevo Trato), that have been historically aimed at
deflecting pressure of social reform processes outside of
the Executive and Congress [42, 65, 66]. Most of these
Commission’s recommendations have never been incor-
porated into policy processes and hence have been heav-
ily criticized by different stakeholders [65]. Further proof
is given by the fact that during President Michelle
Bachelet’s first period between 2006 and 2010, six Presi-
dential Commissions were created (Pensions, Infancy
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Policy, Quality in Education, Transparency and Corrup-
tion, Higher Education and Labor and Equity) [65, 66].
After 2014 and again under President Bachelet’s second
government, five newly appointed Commissions were
formed of which two were related to the same issues
raised in the first government (Transparency and Cor-
ruption and Pensions) casting serious doubts as to the
effectiveness of the recommendations made by these
means [65, 66].
Discussion
While substitutive private health insurance in both Chile
and Germany has developed alongside statutory health
insurance, private insurers have carved out distinctive
niches for themselves and developed different business
models. The political context is such that the political
costs for reforming (or abolishing) substitutive private
health insurance are significant, as private health insur-
ance is supported by health care professionals and afflu-
ent beneficiaries unwilling to forsake the advantages
they receive from it. The fact that the above are differ-
ences in socio-economic context may also be relevant.
In Chile, a middle-income country, public services still
face substantial resource constraint, hence the need to
ration care using waiting lists. In Germany, high spend-
ing on health care (public and private) as well as high
consumer expectations have created a climate where in-
creases in the costs of care are a constant concern in the
face of an ageing population, even though pressure to re-
form is (mostly) on the statutory public system.
One crucial common characteristic in Germany and
Chile has been the creation of a boundary between the
statutory and private insurance regime that enables
people to choose between them. Both countries vary in
their approach to regulating this boundary. In Germany,
the choice between public and private coverage is largely
limited to those with earnings above a legally defined in-
come threshold, while in Chile everyone can take out pri-
vate coverage as long as they can afford it. Additionally,
those who have chosen private insurance in Germany face
substantial barriers if they wish to return to GKV. In con-
trast, within Chile everyone has access to publicly funded
health care with no restrictions upon those who are pri-
vately insured. The choice of countries is predominantly
informed by the boundary problem between public and
private substitutive health insurance [67].
In the case of Germany, one could argue that open enrol-
ment has been an important tool to increase access in pri-
vate health insurance and is a missing policy in the case of
Chile, with the Presidential Commission highlighting this
fact as a desirable policy outcome. However, open enrol-
ment also creates new incentives for adverse selection when
favourable risk users initially seek very low coverage and
then change to more comprehensive coverage when they
happen to develop unfavourable risk factors. It is difficult to
reduce or eliminate these incentives for adverse selection.
One way to deal with this would be to limit access to
private health insurance to within a limited period, for
example after losing or switching coverage from the
public scheme to private health insurance. Another way
of analysing the differences between statutory and pri-
vate insurance is in terms of what services are covered
and the level of financial protection users have. In
Germany, private plans are required to provide coverage
for inpatient and outpatient care as covered by GKV at a
minimum. In Chile, the 2003 reform has introduced a
set of explicit guarantees for the treatment of a set of
major conditions that health insurance is required to
cover. This new regulation aims to address the previous
tendency of Chilean insurers to exclude services and re-
duce financial protection. However, the policy has not
yet been introduced consistently after 11 years of its im-
plementation. This is because its original design failed to
address issues like the perceived higher quality of the
private health sub system, the choice of provider and
waiting times, which one can argue are behind the deci-
sion of users for choosing ISAPRE.
Legislation in Germany precludes substantial rises in
premiums by limiting increases in premiums to occa-
sions where they are necessary to maintain the financial
viability of the insurer. For instance, since 2001 insurers
must charge new subscribers to build up sufficient age-
ing reserves. In Chile, private health insurance premiums
are certainly higher than contributions to FONASA,
usually by a significant margin. This problem is com-
pounded by the substantial amount of co-payments pri-
vately insured patients are required to make (although
co-payments also apply under FONASA, particularly in
the ‘free choice’ tiers). Fischer et al. [68] demonstrated
that, in 2005, co-payments accounted for about one
third of total expenditure for health for privately insured
individuals, compared to about 15% for patients using
FONASA. However, financial protection has increased
substantially in recent years. In the absence of any regu-
lation of the benefits package, the range of services cov-
ered varied widely and many patients were left with
significant gaps in insurance coverage.
Another characteristic of Germany and Chile’s insur-
ance market is that the mix of public and private pro-
viders varies, as does the relationship between providers
and payers. In Germany, both statutory health insurance
and private health insurance largely provide access to
the same type of providers, regardless of their ownership
status. FONASA members in Chile, in contrast, mainly
receive services from public providers, unless they are
prepared to pay extra for additional choice in a pay as
you go voucher scheme. Privately insured patients usu-
ally seek care from private providers, although they can
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receive care in the public sector at any time if they lose
private coverage.
Critics of Germany’s dual insurance system argue that
substitutive private health insurance undermines equity
in the health system. Similar criticism has been voiced
repeatedly in Chile, as privately insured patients typically
have significantly faster access to a wider range of ser-
vices [69, 70]. Privately insured patients in Chile also
typically pay a substantially higher price than they would
for statutory health insurance. However, individuals with
private insurance enjoy more choice and better access to
health services, which does not correspond with the
principle of ‘equal access for equal need’, even if it does
involve higher costs. While various studies on waiting
times in Germany differ in their conclusions, the vari-
ation in access to care in Germany is moderate com-
pared with that of Chile. The variation in access within
Chile has repeatedly been named as a cause of major in-
equalities in health care utilisation and health outcomes
[69–71]. In the 2006 Chile’s Household Survey (Encuesta
de Caracterización Socioeconómica Nacional - CASEN),
the utilisation of health services was 30% higher in the
wealthiest than in the poorest quintile of the population
[72]. A 2003 study also found that those with the lowest
income had the worst self-rated health [73].
Risk segmentation between statutory health insurance
and the private insurance market and its relation to
equity has been a major concern in both Germany and
Chile. In both countries, the possibility for high-income
earners to choose between statutory health insurance
and private health insurance has led to substantial seg-
mentation of risks between the two types of insurance.
In Germany and Chile, the regulatory framework further
exacerbates this tendency, as private health insurers are
allowed (apart from applicants eligible for the basic tar-
iff ) to reject applications for cover and risk rate pre-
miums, exclude cover of pre-existing conditions, charge
extra for dependants and offer discounted premiums in
exchange for high deductibles. This issue was partially
addressed in Chile through recent reforms, such as the
introduction of a risk equalisation scheme between pri-
vate insurers, the regulation of price changes and the
introduction of ‘explicit guarantees’. However, the evi-
dence of the effect of these changes is still lacking and
some of the measures, such as a risk equalization
scheme, have not yet been consistently implemented.
The consequence of this is that the substitutive market
in both countries enjoys a high concentration of ‘low
risks’, while the public sector covers a disproportionate
number of ‘high risks’ – notably women and children,
older people and individuals with larger families. In
Germany, in 2013, about 51% of the privately insured
were men, while women and children accounted for 31%
and 18%, respectively [38]. In the case of Chile, the
participation of the oldest and poorest quintile of the
population in the ISAPRE system is below 5% [27].
Based on data from the 2000 and the 2006 CASEN
household surveys [74], the probability of taking out pri-
vate insurance increases with a higher level of income
and decreases with higher risk of ill-health. Those who
had taken out private insurance were also likely to live
in urban areas and to be better educated than those reli-
ant on statutory health insurance [72].
The Netherlands is a case in which a country with
co-occurring public and private health insurance has
sought to address some of the problems raised here. In
2006, the Netherlands underwent a market-oriented re-
form of its health care system through the Healthcare
Market Structuring Act (Zorgverzekeringswet) which
eliminated the division between public, statutory health
insurance and private health insurance, yielding a uni-
versal basic tariff with comprehensive coverage of health
services provided solely by competing private insurers
[75]. Some immediate effects on the health insurance
market were noted, such as a relatively high rate of con-
sumer mobility among benefit designs in 2006 with
some 18% switching plans and consolidation among
health insurers from 59 to 26 between 2005 and 2014
[75]. Nevertheless, comparisons between the Dutch case
and Germany or Chile are difficult; as we have noted,
the political barriers to reform are high in both Germany
and Chile and, consequently, reform on the scale of the
Dutch case is unlikely at present.
Despite prima facie similarities between the German
and Chilean arrangements between private health insur-
ance and statutory social health insurance, unique devel-
opments in each country respectively have contributed
to divergent approaches to addressing issues such as fi-
nancing and regulation as we have discussed. Conse-
quently, direct comparative analysis between these two
systems is necessarily contingent on the acknowledge-
ment of differences between Germany and Chile, not
only involving the health care system but also intangible
factors such as patient preferences, consumer expecta-
tions, and client orientation of health services in each
country. Nevertheless, in this policy analysis, we have
attempted to demarcate specific indicators of perform-
ance in the health sector, namely, horizontal equity, pro-
gressivity, and productive efficiency, to provide our
analysis with more generalised, comparable measures. A
more direct study of clinical populations in Germany
and Chile, for instance, members of comparable health
plans, could provide greater force to the arguments pre-
sented here through the generation of empirical data;
however, given the relative complexity of national or
supranational regulations on patient data protection and
the challenges of reconciling international, multicentre
studies with these regulations, we have sought to balance
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a more general policy analysis with the inclusion of em-
pirical data from other studies.
Overall giving consumers a choice of public or private
health insurance, as is the case in Germany and in Chile,
is similar in effect to offering a choice of more than one
plan. It is likely to result in two main outcomes: a mar-
ket segmented by degree of risk, and financial barriers to
private coverage for high risks. Negative effects can be
diminished, to some extent by careful policy design, or
can be addressed by regulation. Examples abound and
range from abolishing choice and making social health
insurance compulsory for the whole population, to
introducing more incremental measures to tackle risk
selection and increase access to coverage, such as
cross-subsidies from private to public insurance, or tigh-
ter regulation of insurers, including risk adjustment. In
both countries, the issue of risk selection remains unre-
solved. The loss of ‘high income’ users to the GKV con-
tinues to undermine the idea of equity and solidarity on
which the German social security system rests. There
have also been long-standing concerns about two-class
medicine (Zweiklassenmedizin) and large parts of the
population are uncomfortable with the idea that people
with higher incomes should receive better care. In the
past, efforts to abolish substitutive private health insur-
ance were consistently opposed by an alliance of the
medical profession, the Free Democrats (Freie Demokra-
tische Partei - FDP) and large parts of the Christian
Democratic Party (Unionsparteien - CDU/CSU). How-
ever, increasing unhappiness among the privately insured
may help trigger reform in the years to come [76].
Conclusions
The choice of private insurance in Germany and Chile has
had far-reaching consequences on equity and efficiency in
their respective health systems. Most of these consequences
are due to serious market failures secondary to asymmetries
of information that tend to negatively affect the efficiency
and equity of these countries health systems. Although the
comparative analysis presented was based on the broad defi-
nitions of equity and efficiency used by Thomson et al. [4, 7]
and the OECD framework of insurance analysis [5, 19], the
observed policy outcomes of a dual health insurance system
for both Germany and Chile is a decreased horizontal and
vertical equity of access and finance. When selective private
health insurance was compared against universal public
statutory coverage mandatory for all in our analysis, we ob-
served that users were treated unequally based on how their
contributions to state insurance or private premiums were
determined by socio-demographic features such as health
status, income, age, household size. In both countries having
a dual insurance system has decreased the degree of pro-
gressivity in financing health care by allowing wealthier users
to be pooled separately and hence pay proportionately less
than those with lower incomes. In both systems, productive
efficiency has also been seriously compromised given that
competition has been historically based on risk selection ra-
ther than price or quality. The comparative extent and level
of segmentation of both countries is not clear, but we can
assume that in Chile segmentation will be more important
than in Germany as a direct consequence of higher levels of
inequity existing in the country. Therefore, a comparative
quantitative analysis as to the extent of segmentation levels
in both countries is crucial as to understand the
phenomenon exposed here. Risk segmentation has also had
serious consequences for productive efficiency due to the
tendency of private insurers in both Germany and Chile to
not reduce operating costs by lowering their administrative
costs, but instead vertically integrating with providers and
suppliers. Some attempts have been made in Chile to tackle
the impact of substitutive private insurance on equity and
efficiency, but the long-term consequences of these reforms
have yet to be fully established. There has been less pressure
to reform the dual insurance system in Germany in recent
years, as economic growth and lower unemployment have
meant financial surpluses for the GKV. However, the
long-term challenges to the sustainability and acceptability
of a system that privileges the better-off at the expense of
the efficiency of the system are likely to remain on the
agenda of policy-makers in the years to come. This is spe-
cially so when introducing elements of private coverage into
public systems in health systems such as the British National
Health Service, single payers, or Social Health Insurance.
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